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Abstract
Federated learning is a technique that enables dis-
tributed clients to collaboratively learn a shared
machine learning model without sharing their
training data. This reduces data privacy risks,
however, privacy concerns still exist since it is
possible to leak information about the training
dataset from the trained models weights or param-
eters. Therefore, it is important to develop feder-
ated learning algorithms that train highly accurate
models in a privacy-preserving manner. Setting
up a federated learning environment, especially
with security and privacy guarantees, is a time-
consuming process with numerous configurations
and parameters that can be manipulated. In order
to help clients ensure that collaboration is feasible
and to check that it improves their model accuracy,
a real-world simulator for privacy-preserving and
secure federated learning is required.
In this paper, we introduce PrivacyFL, which is an
extensible, easily configurable and scalable sim-
ulator for federated learning environments. Its
key features include latency simulation, robust-
ness to client departure/failure, support for both
centralized (with one or more servers) and de-
centralized (serverless) learning, and configurable
privacy and security mechanisms based on differ-
ential privacy and secure multiparty computation
(MPC).
In this paper, we motivate our research, describe
the architecture of the simulator and associated
protocols, and discuss its evaluation in numerous
scenarios that highlight its wide range of func-
tionality and its advantages. Our paper addresses
a significant real-world problem: checking the
feasibility of participating in a federated learning
environment under a variety of circumstances. It
also has a strong practical impact because orga-
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nizations such as hospitals, banks, and research
institutes, which have large amounts of sensitive
data and would like to collaborate, would greatly
benefit from having a system that enables them to
do so in a privacy-preserving and secure manner.
1. Introduction
Federated learning has become an important area of research
as it provides an optimal solution to train a collaborative
model when data is dispersed across different organizations.
Its primary advantage is that it allows statistical models to
be trained over remote entities while keeping data localized.
For example, individual hospitals can collaboratively train a
machine learning model in order to improve their predictive
accuracy for a given task. However, most clients are un-
willing to share their data or inadvertently leak information
due to internal privacy policies or regulation. Therefore,
it is important to develop federated learning frameworks
that train highly accurate models in a privacy-preserving
manner.
Let us assume that there are several hospitals that want
to develop a shared machine learning model. First, each
hospital trains a local model, ∆Wi, rather than sending
raw data to a centralized server. Hospitals act as remote
clients and communicate with a central server at regular
intervals to learn a global model. For every iteration, the
hospitals send their local model to the server. The server
computes and sends back the global model to individual
hospitals. This process repeats until convergence occurs
or some sort of stopping criterion is achieved. There are
two main drawbacks in this approach: (i) communication is
not secure, and (ii) collusion of n− 1 clients in a n client
system reveals the model of the remaining client. The use of
MPC helps with the first issue and the second one requires
a privacy-preserving mechanism such as differential privacy.
This is illustrated in Figure 1. The differentially private
inputs, ∆W dpi , are encrypted and sent to the server. The
server aggregates the inputs received from the clients and
sends them back to the client.
Some of the core challenges of federated learning include:
• Communication cost: This is a huge bottleneck as
it increases as the number of iterations increases and
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Figure 1. Secure and Privacy-Preserving Federated Learning
becomes an issue as the number of clients increases.
Using the simulation results, a system designer can de-
cide whether it is feasible to participate in the federated
learning environment.
• Privacy and security guarantees: In a federated
learning environment, a malicious client can compro-
mise the privacy of individuals in the training data by
inferring details of a training dataset from the model’s
weights (Nasr et al., 2018; Shokri et al., 2017). These
privacy issues can be addressed through the use of
differential privacy and MPC. Our simulator allows
the system designer to evaluate the performance with
differential privacy and security mechanisms.
While designing a federated learning environment, it is im-
portant to understand the trade-offs between privacy, effi-
ciency, and accuracy. System designers should be able to
choose different parameters and compare multiple scenarios
in order to find the right trade-offs for their environment.
Simulators are essential for federated learning environments
for the following reasons:
• To evaluate accuracy: It should be possible to simu-
late federated models and compare their accuracy with
local models.
• To evaluate total time taken: Communication between
distant clients can become expensive. Simulations are
useful for evaluating if client-client and client-server
communications are beneficial.
• To evaluate approximate bounds on convergence and
time take for convergence.
• To simulate real-time dropouts: Clients in a federated
environment may drop out at any time.
Our simulator, PrivacyFL, is designed to specifically address
these issues. It is efficient in terms of speed and execution
time as client and server operations happen in a parallelized
manner. It provides numerous differentially private mech-
anisms including the Laplacian mechanism (Dwork et al.,
2006), the Gaussian mechanism (Dwork et al., 2006), and
the Staircase mechanism (Geng et al., 2015). System design-
ers can choose from any of these mechanisms to ensure that
the learning is privacy-preserving. Our system also provides
the option for clients to use a Diffie-Hellman key exchange
for inbuilt security. The simulator can also easily support
the addition of new privacy-preserving algorithms. It is
composed of generalized classes and functions that make
it easy for developers to add/modify new algorithms and
protocols. Along with simulating federated environments
that use one or more central servers, our simulator is also
able to simulate a completely decentralized environment,
i.e., a federated learning system without a centralized server.
In the real world, environments are dynamic with clients
failing, dropping off, or being added at run-time. Being able
to model this is an important requirement of a simulator
for federated learning and PrivacyFL is able to handle such
dynamic cases. It is able to simulate computation and com-
munication times to evaluate how long a client would have
to wait for each step of the protocol to complete in a real
world setting.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we discuss existing frameworks in the field of
privacy-preserving secure federated learning. Section 3
describes background work and foundational concepts. We
provide a detailed explanation of our architecture, classes,
and life-cycle in Section 4. In Section 5, we discuss privacy-
preserving and secure aggregation algorithms. Experiments
and evaluations under different scenarios are described in
Section 6, and Section 7 discusses the reproducibility of our
experiments. We conclude with a summary and a discussion
of our future work in Section 8.
2. Related Work
Federated learning is an approach to train machine learning
models on distributed data. The federated averaging algo-
rithm proposed by (McMahan & Ramage, 2017) follows a
synchronous training approach in which each client trains
a local model and sends it to a centralized server, which
computes the average of all models. The server sends the
average model back to the clients. Numerous approaches
have been proposed to enhance privacy and security in a
federated learning environment. (McMahan et al., 2017)
applied differential privacy to provide the necessary privacy
guarantees whereas (Bonawitz et al., 2017) proposed a se-
cure aggregation protocol for privacy-preserving machine
learning in a federated environment.
(Bonawitz et al., 2019) built a production system, the first
of its kind, for federated learning in the field of mobile
devices using TensorFlow. The authors use the Federated
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Averaging algorithm proposed by (McMahan & Ramage,
2017). However, their system has the following limitations,
(i) though it does support privacy, it does not allow for
new mechanisms to be added easily, (ii) it is dependent
on TensorFlow so you cannot use it with other machine
learning libraries, (iii) it does not focus on simulating virtual
environments with multiple servers and multiple clients at
different locations, and (iv) it is not very efficient because it
does not support the parallel execution of training sessions.
Our simulator, PrivacyFL, was specifically developed to
overcome these issues by providing a highly configurable
system. For more details, please see Section 4.
There are a myriad of challenges pertaining to privacy in
federated learning. In addition to guaranteeing privacy, it
is important to make sure that the communication cost is
cheap and efficient. There are numerous privacy definitions
for federated learning (Geyer et al., 2017)(Bhowmick et al.,
2018) (Thakkar et al., 2019). We can classify them into
2 categories: local privacy and global privacy. In local
privacy, each client sends a differentially private value that
is secure/encrypted to the server. In the global model, the
server adds differentially private noise to the final output.
MPC and differential privacy are the most common tech-
niques to guarantee security and privacy in a federated en-
vironment setup (Bhowmick et al., 2018) (McMahan et al.,
2017)(Bonawitz et al., 2017).
In a federated learning setup, instead of sharing data, clients
share models. Though this seems to provide increased pri-
vacy, there have been a multitude of privacy attacks, in-
cluding reconstruction and membership inference attacks
(Shokri et al., 2017)(Nasr et al., 2019)(Melis et al., 2019),
demonstrating that additional privacy is required in the form
of protecting model parameters. Cryptographic techniques
such as secure multiparty computation (MPC) (Chaum et al.,
1987; Goldreich, 1998; Yao, 1986) guarantee that clients
don’t learn anything except the final cumulative model
weight. Also, these techniques do not compromise the ac-
curacy of models. MPC allows clients to collaborate in
order to compute a function without clients revealing their
individual (and possibly sensitive) inputs to other clients.
Though MPC reveals only the final result and not the individ-
ual inputs of individual clients, sometimes, this information
is sufficient to infer the individual input of a client. For
example, let us consider the scenario where n − 1 clients
collude against an honest client in a n client federated en-
vironment and the clients want to compute the overall sum.
Once the sum is known, the clients can identify the private
input of the non-colluding client. In order to overcome
this, differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2006) can be used
in addition to MPC. This solution is resistant to collusion
attacks and Figure 1 represents a privacy-preserving secure
federated learning environment.
The above-mentioned methods are not dependent on each
other and can exist independently in a federated learning
environment. Our simulator allows the system designer to
choose and configure different privacy and security mech-
anisms according to their needs and provides a flexible
architecture.
Our system provides necessary guarantees for the ”honest-
but-curious” threat model. In this threat model, all the
clients in the system follow the protocol but try their best
to identify the data/model of other clients. As part of our
future work, we plan to add solutions to the ”malicious”
threat model where clients need not follow the protocol and
may conduct adversarial attacks.
3. Background
3.1. Differential Privacy
PrivacyFL provides several differential privacy mechanisms
that can be used and configured by the system designer.
Differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2006) is a mathematical
privacy framework that captures the notion of risk when an
individual is included in a dataset. A detailed explanation
of differential privacy and the associated mechanisms used
in the paper is provided in Appendix A.
3.2. Differentially Private Federated Logistic
Regression
We use differentially private logistic regression for our ex-
periments. A detailed explanation of differentially private
federated logistic regression is provided in Appendix B.
4. Architecture
The purpose of our simulator is to provide a light-weight but
efficient Python framework that enables clients to simulate
privacy-preserving secure federated learning. In a simula-
tion, a client corresponds to an instance of the ClientAgent
class. Each client agent is capable of interacting with the
other client agents to establish common keys before the sim-
ulation. Client agents also communicate with an instance
of the ServerAgent class if configured to be a centralized
system. The server agent is an agent who is not training
its models but instead serves to run the federated learning
algorithm. It is responsible for requesting weights from the
clients, averaging the weights, and returning to the clients
the federated weights. Many applications will only require
one server agent, but it is worth noting that with some mod-
ifications the framework can handle any number of server
agents.
To run the simulation, an instance of the Initializer class
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Figure 2. System diagram containing relationships between the
important classes in PrivacyFL
must be created. The initializer will create the agents in the
simulation and also invoke the client agents to perform any
offline-stage logic such as key exchanges. The initializer
also gives each agent a directory, which contains a map-
ping of agent names to agent instances so that agents can
invoke each others methods, thereby enabling all agents to
communicate. The initializer also gives each client agent
an instance of the ModelEvaluator class, which it uses to
evaluate the federated learning on a test dataset.
4.1. Simulation Lifecycle
This section provides an overview of the steps carried out in
a simulation.
1. System designer wishing to simulate a federated learn-
ing environment specifies simulation parameters in
config.py and runs run_simulation.py.
2. run_simulation.py creates an instance of Initial-
izer, which instantiates the client agents and server
agent. It also creates a mapping of agent names to
instances and passes those to each client.
3. run_simulation.py invokes the initializer’s
run_simulation(), which subsequently calls the
server agent’s
request_values() method.
4. Repeat for i = 1, 2, 3, ... num iterations :
4.1 Server agent requests weights from clients in
parallel by invoking each client’s produce_
weights() method.
4.2 In produce_weights(), each client trains its
machine learning model on Di, the dataset for
that iteration. Each client saves the weights lo-
cally, and then creates a copy of its weights to
which it adds a security offset and differentially
private noise. It returns the modified weights to
the server.
4.3 Upon receiving the weights from each client, the
server averages the weights and returns the fed-
erated weights to each client in parallel through
their receive_weights().
4.4 Upon receiving the federated weights for iteration
i from the server, each client computes the accu-
racy of the federated model vs its local model on
the test-set. Each client then computes whether
its weights have converged and tells the server
whether it is dropping out after this iteration.
4.5 To conclude the iteration, the server tells all the
clients which other clients have dropped out of
the simulation.
4.2. Classes
There are 6 main classes in the simulator namely Message,
Agent, ClientAgent, ServerAgent, Initializer, and Direc-
tory.
4.2.1. THE MESSAGE CLASS
All agent-agent communications occur by one agent in-
voking another agent’s method with a message as the sole
argument. The message class contains metadata about the
communication as well as a body attribute, which is a dic-
tionary containing all the values an agent is sending.
4.2.2. THE AGENT CLASS
The Agent class is not meant to be initialized directly.
Rather, its intended usage is to be sub-classed to create
agents with more specific behavior. It is the base class for
the ClientAgent and ServerAgent classes we provide, but
can be sub-classed to create a different kind of agent if
ClientAgent and ServerAgent are not easily modified to fit
the needs of your simulation.
4.2.3. THE CLIENTAGENT CLASS
An instance of the ClientAgent class is an entity that is
training a machine learning model on the same task as the
other client agents. Client agents are assigned an agent_
number, which is then appended to the string client_
agent to create their name. For example, if there are
three clients they are named client agent0, client agent1,
and client agent2. There are two important public methods
of ClientAgent that are invoked by the ServerAgent in the
online portion of the simulation.
• produce_weights(self,message) is called
every iteration and prompts the client to train its ma-
chine learning model on its dataset for that iteration.
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The message contains the iteration, a mutex lock used
for multi-threading, and information about the simu-
lated time.
• receive_weights(self,message) is called
every iteration when the server has federated weights to
return to the client. The message contains the iteration,
weights, and the simulated time this message is re-
ceived. This method returns True if the client agent’s
weights have converged with the federated weights and
False otherwise.
• remove_active_clients(self,message)
is called at the end of the iteration. The message
contains the iteration, list of clients that have dropped
out, and the simulated time the message is received.
This method is only used if the simulation is configured
with client drop out.
In addition, client agents have some methods for the client-
client communication that are used to establish shared com-
mon keys with the other clients.
• The send_pubkeys(self) of each client is in-
voked by the initializer once all client agents have been
initialized. In this method, each client computes secrets
ai,1, . . . , ai,n and sends ai,j to client j by invoking that
client’s receive_pubkey() method.
• In receive_pubkey(message), each client
saves the public key sent to it by the other clients.
• initialize_common_keys(self) is called
once all clients have exchanged public keys using the
above two methods. In this method, the common key
list is initialized. This common key list will be used to
produce security offsets for the online portion of the
simulation.
4.2.4. THE SERVERAGENT CLASS
An instance of the ServerAgent class represents a third-party
entity that coordinates the online portion of the simulation.
ServerAgent has one method:
• request_values(num_iterations) is called
by an instance of Initializer to signal the server agent
to start requesting values from clients. request_
values() first requests weights in parallel from
the clients by calling their produce_weights().
It then averages these weights and returns them to
the clients in parallel by calling their receive_
weights() method. Finally, if the simulation is con-
figured to allow client dropout, the server invokes the
clients’ remove_active_clients() to indicate
which clients have dropped out at the end of this itera-
tion.
4.2.5. THE INITIALIZER CLASS
An instance of the Initializer class is used to initialize the
agents and model evaluator. In addition any offline stage
logic, such as prompting the clients to perform a Diffie-
Hellman key exchange, should occur in this class. In
our example, it loads the MNIST dataset (LeCun et al.,
1998), partitions it, and distributes the correct amount of
data to each client. To commence the simulation, one
creates an instance of the Initializer class and invokes its
run_simulation() method, which then invokes the
server agent’s request_values() to commence the on-
line portion of the simulation.
4.2.6. THE DIRECTORY CLASS
An instance of the Directory class contains a mapping of
agent names to agent instances that allows agents to invoke
other agents’ methods by only having their name. An in-
stance of Directory is created in the __init__ method
of the Initializer class after all the agents have been cre-
ated. It is then passed on to all the agents using their
set_directory() method.
4.3. Configurations and Features
PrivacyFL can be configured to simulate a variety of scenar-
ios with the configuration parameters available in config.
py. These configuration parameters are described in Table
3 in Appendix E.
In addition, config.py allows system designers to set several
other parameters such as the number of clients, custom 
and dataset sizes for each client, and thread-safe random
seed for reproducibility.
5. Use case
To evaluate our simulator, we developed a secure and differ-
entially private federated logistic regression algorithm.
5.1. Differentially Private Federated Averaging
The federated averaging algorithm is one of the most popular
approaches of federated learning. It is a customized version
of parallel Stochastic Gradient Descent. In our approach,
Algorithm 1, each client runs U rounds of local SGD and
returns the trained weights. Clients make use of new data
every round. Here, each client adds the difference of gamma
random variables to their unperturbed weights. In the ag-
gregation phase, the server adds the perturbed weights it
receives from all values. The server aggregates the weights
into the final model, which are differentially private because
L(µ, λ) = µn +
∑n
k=1 γk − γ′k
γk and γ′k are Gamma distributed random variables.
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The client-server communication happens R times unless a
client drops out.
We propose and make use of two algorithms for evalua-
tion and their explanations are provided in Appendix C. We
propose Algorithm 2, where clients reuse old data used in
previous rounds and also make use of any new data avail-
able.
The main difference between Algorithm 1 and Algorithm
2 is that, in Algorithm 2 clients retrain their model from
scratch on their entire local dataset, which may or may not
get updated every round, and don’t use the weights received
from the server while running local gradient descent. In
Algorithm 1, clients compare their weights from the previ-
ous iteration with that of the global weights they receive
from the server. With all algorithms, if local convergence is
achieved then the client can drop out of the system.
In all the algorithms, when clients receive the federated
weights from the server they are able to subtract the differ-
entially private noise that they contributed to the federated
weights.
5.2. Secure Aggregation
To provide the necessary security guarantees, we use a com-
bination Diffie-Hellman key exchange and Pseudo-Random
Generators to ensure a secure aggregation protocol. Our
protocols ensure that clients only need to communicate with
each other once at the start of the simulation to ensure se-
curity for all iterations, thereby reducing the amount of
client-client communications and overall communication
time.
6. Experiments
For our evaluation, we configured the clients to train on
UCI’s Machine Learning MNIST dataset (LeCun et al.,
1998) (Newman et al., 1998) for eight iterations. This
dataset is easily loaded using scikit-learn’s datasets.
load_digits() module. We ran the experiments on
a MacBook Pro 2.3 GHz Intel Core i5, using Python’s multi-
threading module for parallelization. All experiments were
initialized with the same thread-safe random seeds, ensuring
fair comparisons where possible. The experiments and their
evaluation can be found in Appendix D.
7. Availability
PrivacyFL is available on GitHub at https://github.
com/vaikkunth/PrivacyFL/ under the MIT Li-
cense. To run the simulator, the repository should be
cloned locally and a conda environment with the neces-
sary dependencies should be created as shown in Figure
3. The config.py file contains a variety of parameters as
described in Section 4.3 that allow the simulation to be cus-
tomized. utils/data_formatting.py provides an
an example of how to pre-process dataset for the simula-
tionusing the MNIST dataset as an example. In addition,
the config.py file also has random seeds for each client
that ensure that randomness is handled in a reproducible
thread-safe manner.
Figure 3. Steps to execute the code
8. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we presented PrivacyFL, a simulator for
privacy-preserving and secure federated learning. The pri-
mary features of our system include latency simulation, ro-
bustness to client departure/failure, support for both server-
based and serverless federated learning, and tunable param-
eters for differential privacy and MPC.
We evaluated our simulator by running multiple experiments
on federated logistic regression to demonstrate the flexibility
of our framework. Our simulator and protocols can be easily
applied to other federated machine learning algorithms as
well. PrivacyFL is highly customizable and system design-
ers can easily configure parameters such as setting different
latencies, choosing appropriate differential privacy mecha-
nisms, and simulating clients dropping out or being added
dynamically.
As part of our future work, we plan to explore solutions to
the ”malicious” threat model where clients need not follow
the protocol and may conduct adversarial attacks. We plan to
extend our simulator to real-time cluster environments and
perform experiments on larger datasets. Once our simulator
is capable of being deployed in a cloud computing platform,
we plan to work with pilot partners for the real-time testing
of our system and protocols.
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A. Differential Privacy
Definition 1 ((, δ)-Differential Privacy) A randomized
mechanism M satisfies (, δ)-differential privacy ((, δ)-
DP) when there exists  > 0, δ > 0, such that
Pr [M(D1) ∈ S] ≤ ePr [M(D2) ∈ S] + δ
holds for every S ⊆ Range(M) and for all datasets D1 and
D2 differing on at most one element.
When δ = 0, we say that the randomized mechanismM
satisfies (, 0)-differential privacy
Definition 2 (Global Sensitivity) For any real-valued query
function t : D → R, where D denotes the set of all possible
datasets, the global sensitivity ∆ of t is defined as
∆ = max
D1∼D2
|t(D1)− t(D2)|,
for all D1 ∈ D and D2 ∈ D.
A.0.1. LAPLACIAN MECHANISM
The Laplacian mechanism preserves -differential privacy
(Dwork et al., 2006). We make use of the random noise
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X drawn from the symmetric Laplacian distribution. The
zero-mean Laplacian distribution has a probability density
function f(x).
f(x) =
1
2λ
e−
|x|
λ ,
where λ is the scale parameter. Given ∆ of the query func-
tion t, and the privacy loss parameter , the Laplacian mech-
anismM uses random noise X drawn from the Laplacian
distribution with scale λ = ∆ .
A.0.2. DISTRIBUTING DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE NOISE
In addition to the basic differential privacy mechanisms,
where each client adds differentially private noise, our
framework also supports distributed differentially private
noise addition. In distributed differential privacy, each client
contributes a portion of the total differentially private noise.
The sum of all these individual contributions result in a
differentially private noise value.
As the Laplace mechanism satisfies differential privacy, we
show how a Laplace Random variable can be generated
from Gamma random variables.
L(µ, λ) = µn +
∑n
p=1 γp − γ′p,
where µ and λ are the mean and scale parameters of the
Laplacian mechanism.
γp and γ′p are Gamma distributed random variables with
probability density functions defined as :
(1/s)1/n
Γ(1/n) x
1/n−1e−x/s,
where 1/n is the shape parameter, s is the scale parameter
and Γ(p) =
∫∞
0
xp−1e−xdx
We make use of this technique where each client adds γp −
γ′p in our distributed Algorithm 1.
B. Differentially Private Federated Logistic
Regression
We use differentially private logistic regression for our ex-
periments.
In a local differentially private output perturbation setting,
each client adds differentially private noise to their model
parameters. In this setting, each client adds Laplacian noise
to their model weights and participates in federated learn-
ing. Once clients train private models, they coordinate with
the server to compute the global model. This client-server
communication is repeated till convergence or a predefined
number of rounds.
Let wˆidp, for i ∈ 1 to n, depict the local model constructed
by each client after minimizing the objective function and
adding differentially private noise to their weights. Here w
represents the vector of weights and n represents the number
of clients.
Wˆ = 1n
∑n
i=1 wˆi
dp is the differntially-private cumulative
model.
In a trusted server setting, every client computes its model
and sends it to the server. The server aggregates the model
inputs it receives from clients and adds differentially private
noise to the average. Here,
Wˆ = 1n
∑n
i=1 wˆi + η, η is the differentially private noise
added to the cumulative model.
We also consider the case where each client contributes to
a portion of the differentially private noise in the global
setting. That is each client adds wˆidpPartial to its model
parameters, for i ∈ 1 to n. The server does the following,
Wˆ = 1n
∑n
i=1 wˆi
dpPartial.
For logistic regression in the federated multi-client setting,
(Jayaraman et al., 2018) proposed the following: For 1-
Lipschitz , ∆ = 2n∗k∗α for a federated multi-client setting.
Here k is the size of the smallest dataset amongst the n
clients and α is the regularization parameter. Hence, η =
Laplace( 2n∗k∗α∗ ), where  is the privacy loss parameter.
C. Algorithms
Algorithm 1 Differentially Private Federated Averaging -
Each client contributes a portion of the total differentially
private noise
Server Implements:
Initialize w0
for r ← 1 to R do
for every client k ∈ n in parallel do
wkr+1 ← ClientProcedure(k,wr)
end for
wr+1 ← 1n
∑n
i=1 w
i
r+1
end for
ClientProcedure(k,w):
for local gradient update u← 1 to U do
w ← w − η∇g(w)
end for
Return w + γ − γ′
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Algorithm 2 Differentially Private Weighted Averaging
Server Implements:
for r ← 1 to R do
for every client k ∈ n in parallel do
wkr+1 ← ClientProcedure(k,wr)
end for
wr+1 ← 1n
∑n
i=1 w
i
r+1
end for
ClientProcedure(k,ws):
if Round 1 then
Initialize wdpc = 0
end if
if ws < wdpc then
Initialize w
for local gradient update u← 1 to U do
w ← w − η∇g(w)
end for
wdpc ← w + γ − γ′
end if
Return wdpc
D. Experiments
D.1. Experiment 1: Accuracy vs Privacy vs Number of
Clients Trade-offs
One of the principal uses of the simulator is to enable clients
to assess whether the accuracy of their model would in-
crease if they participated in the federated learning. For
that reason, we compare the mean accuracy of the clients’
model with the accuracy of the federated global model for
each iteration. We used Algorithm 2. When computing
a client’s accuracy on iteration i, we consider its weights
with no differential privacy since this scenario corresponds
to clients not participating in the federated learning, thus
having no need to add differentially private noise. Figure
4 compares the mean of three clients’ accuracy with the
federated accuracy for different values of , where a smaller
value of  corresponds to less noise. As expected, the fed-
erated model’s accuracy increases as  increases, but there
is not a significant difference between  = 1 and  = 8. It
is also important to note that the federated accuracy for the
 = 0.1 line increases more rapidly than the mean client
accuracy. This is expected behavior since the amount of
noise added per client is smaller as the size of each client’s
dataset increases by thirty samples each iteration.
In the following example, we simulate a larger number of
clients. We used the KDDCup99 dataset (Bay et al., 2000)
and Algorithm 1. In Figure 5, one can also see the result
of varying the number of clients and . As expected, the
accuracy of the federated model increases with  since less
Figure 4. Mean client accuracy on test dataset versus federated
model accuracy for different . Clients follow Algorithm 2.
noise is added. Also, accuracy increases as the number
of clients increases. This behavior is expected since more
clients contributing to the federated model should increase
the accuracy of the federated model. We can also see that
convergence happens at a faster rate when the number of
parties increases.
Figure 5. Accuracy vs Iterations for different values of  and num-
ber of parties
D.2. Experiment 2: Privacy Constraints
This experiment illustrates a use case where each client can
have different amounts of data and privacy requirements.
Suppose Clients 1 and 2 each have 150 data points and  =
1.0. However, Client 3 has 250 data points but also a more
stringent privacy requirement,  = 0.1. Clients 1 and 2 may
want to decide whether they should only collaborate among
themselves, include Client 3, or participate in federated
learning at all.
• Scenario 1. No clients participate in federated learning
so their accuracy is their own model’s accuracy.
• Scenario 2. Clients 1 and 2 participate in the federated
learning but do not include Client 3 because Client 3
has  = 0.1 while Clients 1 and 2 have  = 1.0.
• Scenario 3. All three clients participate in the federated
learning and use Client 3’s privacy requirement,  =
0.1.
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• Scenario 4. All three clients participate in federated
learning, but Clients 1 and 2 use their privacy require-
ment  = 1.0, and Client 3 uses its privacy requirement,
 = 0.1
D.3. Experiment 3: Decentralized (Serverless)
Federated Learning
The simulation can also be easily modified beyond the con-
figuration parameters. In the following example, we sub-
classed the Agent class to create a new kind of Agent that is
able to perform federated machine learning without a server.
In this case, clients send their masked weights directly to the
other clients. Once a client has received the weights from
all the other clients, it is able to average them to create a
federated model. Figure 6 shows the results of three clients
each training according to Algorithm 2, with thirty data
points per iteration for seven iterations. In this example,
clients use the security protocol but no differential privacy.
This behavior is achieved by setting the USE DP PRIVACY
flag to False and the USE SECURITY flag to True. As
one can see from Figure 6, all clients clearly benefit from
participating in the federated learning in this situation.
Figure 6. Simulation with Algorithm 2 but modified so that no
server is required.
D.4. Experiment 4: Real-World Latency Simulation
For this experiment, we simulated the situation where the
clients are in different geographic locations. We config-
ured three clients as if they were in the Boston, Singapore,
NYC, with the server located closest to the NYC client. As
such, we designated the following communication latencies:
(i) Boston-Server: 0.3 seconds, (ii) Singapore-Server: 2.0
seconds, (iii) NYC-Server: 0.1 seconds.
One can also set client-client latencies. In this example,
those only come into effect for the offline portion of the
simulation since there is no client-client communication
during the online portion of the simulation.
Iteration
Simulated Time to Receive Fed-
erated Weights (seconds)
Boston Singapore NYC
Iteration 1 4.310 6.010 4.110
Iteration 2 4.306 6.006 4.106
Iteration 3 0.909 Dropped Out 0.709
Table 1. Simulated time to receive federated weights by iteration
in an example where Singapore, the farthest client, drops out after
the second iteration.
Iteration
Personal Computation Time to
Produce Weights (seconds)
Boston Singapore NYC
Iteration 1 0.0128 0.0101 0.0102
Iteration 2 0.0106 0.0059 0.0072
Iteration 3 0.0086 Dropped out 0.0083
Table 2. Time taken per client to produce weights using 1 on 100
data points per iteration.
Table 1 shows the simulated time, which measures the time
from the start of each iteration to the time when clients
would receive the federated weights from the server. The
simulated time is available for any step in the protocol since
it is included in every message between clients. Upon re-
ceiving a message, an agent computes how long its logic has
taken. The agent then adds the time that its logic as taken as
well as the simulated communication time for whomever the
client is sending the message to. This produces a new simu-
lated time for the receiving agent. In Table 1 one can also
see that the simulated times for Boston and NYC are signifi-
cantly lower on the third iteration. This is because clients
were permitted to drop out since the CLIENT DROPOUT
flag was set to True. The Singapore-Server latency is the
highest, which means that once Singapore drops out at the
end of the second simulation the other clients receive the
federated weights faster since the server does not need to
wait on the Singaporean client’s weights. Similarly, the time
taken by each client to compute its weights on each iteration
is also displayed by the simulator.
Table 2 shows the time taken by each client to compute its
weights on each iteration.
E. Configuration Parameters
The configuration parameters are described in Table 3
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USE SECURITY If True, the clients perform a
Diffie-Hellman key exchange in
the offline portion of the simu-
lation to establish common keys
for encryption. Has no effect on
federated accuracy.
USE DP PRIVACY If True, clients will add differen-
tially private noise with parame-
ters specified in the config file.
SUBTRACT DP NOISE If True, clients will subtract the
noise they added to the federated
model upon receiving it from the
server. When False, clients use
the federated model computed by
the server.
CLIENT DROPOUT If True, a client drops out of
simulation when each weight in
the federated model is within
config.tolerance of the client’s
weight. The simulation continues
without that client.
SIMULATE LATENCIES If True, the system simulates
how long it would take for
each step in the protocol to
complete using the user-defined
communication latencies in con-
fig.LATENCY DICT. If False,
this information is not displayed.
USING CUMULATIVE If using our data partitioning
module, this flag is useful for
experimenting between dataset
options. If False, the dataset
for each iteration includes only
the new data available that itera-
tion. This makes sense for Algo-
rithm 1. If True, the size of the
dataset grows each iteration by
the amount of new data. This con-
figuration makes more sense for
Algorithm 2, where the weights
of the ith iteration are not used
in producing the weights of the
i+ 1th iteration.
Table 3. Configuration Parameters
